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WHY LAW STUDENTS SHOULD TAKE THE FEDERAL COURTS
COURSE

ROGER GOLDMAN*

INTRODUCTION
When second-year law students ask me why they should take the third-year
course in Federal Courts, I usually tell them that it’s a capstone course—one
that deepens their understanding of the building-block classes they’ve already
taken. My reference is to courses in Constitutional Law, Administrative Law,
Civil Procedure, Employment Discrimination, Labor Law, Admiralty, and
other federal-law-related topics. And to prove my point, I pose two questions.
First, from their understanding of Erie,1 is there federal common law? And
second, does the U.S. Supreme Court ever have the power to decide the
meaning of state law, contrary to the decision of the state high court from
which an appeal is taken? Ninety-five percent of the responses to both
questions are “No.” So when I tell them there is indeed federal common law2
and that the U.S. Supreme Court may reverse a state court’s decision on the
meaning of its own law,3 I invariably am assured of a few more students for
next year’s federal courts class.
I. TRENDS ON THE SUPREME COURT AND IN CONGRESS
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided several cases which have
given new meaning to the terms “federalism”—respect for the states; and
“separation of powers”—respect for a co-equal branch of the federal

* Callis Family Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This article is dedicated
to Paul J. Mishkin, who taught me Federal Courts in law school and who, in the words of Henry
Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s acknowledgment of Felix Frankfurter, “first opened [my mind] to
these problems.” See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at ix (1st ed. 1953). The author acknowledges the invaluable suggestions
on earlier drafts of this article from colleagues, practitioners, and my former students in Federal
Courts.
1. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal district court judges in
diversity cases must apply state substantive law rather than federal common law in deciding the
case).
2. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
3. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
745
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government. These decisions have involved a clash between these two
doctrines resulting in a weakening of Congress’s powers in order to protect the
interests of the states.
There have been many such decisions, typically decided by a 5-4 vote,
addressing the question whether Congress may provide remedies to persons,
usually state employees, for the state’s violation of federal law. In the first of
the modern cases, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,4 the Court struck down
a provision of a federal statute that permitted the tribe to sue the state. The
Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment5 was a restriction on Congress’s
power under Article I, Section Eight “to regulate Commerce . . . with the
Indian Tribes.”6 And in Alden v. Maine,7 the Court held that the result is the
same if Congress permits a suit against the state in state court for violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). There the ruling was based not on the
Eleventh Amendment, which only applies to suits against the state in federal
court, but on the doctrine of sovereign immunity—a doctrine that is inherent in
the Constitution and that, like the Eleventh Amendment, prevents Congress
from giving private parties8 a remedy against the state under Article I, section
8. The state is still obligated to obey the federal law; however, the law cannot
be enforced by private individuals, unless the state consents to suit.9 Thus, in
the area of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, no court—state
or federal—may give a remedy to plaintiffs in a suit against the state, even
though there is a clear violation of federal law.10 The majority of today’s
Court—albeit a bare majority—is more concerned about the infringement on
state sovereignty occasioned by the federal statute than the loss of a remedy to
individuals whose federal statutory rights have been violated.

4. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
6. The one exception where a state may be sued by an individual pursuant to a statute
enacted under Congress’s Article I, Section Eight power is the power to “establish . . . uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
7. 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
8. The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity do not apply where the United States
seeks to enforce the law.
9. The Court had previously held that the FLSA, when applied to the states, was an
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power under the Tenth Amendment in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1976), but Usery was overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
10. In general, injunctive and declaratory judgment relief may be obtained against a state
official, but damages against the official are not permitted if the payment is going to come from
the state. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425602

GOLDMAN ARTICLE.DOC

2009]

WHY LAW STUDENTS SHOULD TAKE THE FEDERAL COURTS COURSE

747

Given its inability to provide a private remedy against the states despite its
Article I, Section Eight power, Congress has relied on an alternative
constitutional provision: its power to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. (Most of the cases have involved the reach of Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, hence the term, “Section Five power.”)
For the most part, the Court has invalidated these efforts on the grounds that
Congress has the power only to enforce the amendments, not to enact
substantive law that differs from what the Court has said violates the
amendments.11 For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,12 state
employees alleged age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Court held that this portion of the
ADEA was unconstitutional. It contended that Congress was in effect making
age discrimination a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, whereas the
Court in previous decisions had held that age discrimination by the state,
unlike race or gender discrimination, is not generally a violation of the
Constitution.13
Besides making it clear that only federal laws that are actual remedies for
constitutional violations pass muster under the enforcement clauses, the Court
has devised a test to determine what is a remedy: a remedy must be congruent
and proportional to constitutional violations by the state. This standard
requires the Court to evaluate the kind of evidence presented to Congress. The
dissenting Justices view this requirement as inappropriate, because it puts the
Court in the position of second-guessing a co-equal branch of government.14
The difference between a decision like Boerne on Congress’s power under
Section Five and a decision like Seminole Tribe that Congress has violated the

11. The most important case for the proposition that Congress under the Enforcement
Clauses of the Civil Rights Amendments may only provide remedies for what the Court would
find are violations of the substantive provisions of the Amendments is City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997), disapproving contrary language in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966), that gave a broader reading to Congress’s enforcement power. The latter case
involved an issue of voting rights, an area in which the Court has traditionally deferred to
Congress. Whether today’s Court will continue to be so deferential will be determined in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, probable jurisdiction noted,
January 9, 2009, argued April 29, 2009. Transcript of Oral Argument, Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, No. 08-3222 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2009). The question presented is “whether the
appellant is eligible to ‘bail out’ from the preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, and whether Congress provided sufficient justification of current voting
discrimination when it extended the requirement in 2006 for another twenty-five years.”
12. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–17 (1976).
14. It is also a topic that is of great interest to senators on the Judiciary Committee when
they question Supreme Court nominees. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 549–645 (2005).
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Eleventh Amendment by using its Article I, Section Eight powers is that in the
former case, the law is invalid as far as it applies to the states; in the latter, the
law still substantively regulates the states, but a private individual cannot sue
the state for its violation.15
While demonstrating its concern that the state itself not be sued by private
individuals under federal statutes, the Court has been more willing to override
federalism concerns by permitting Congress to override state laws through the
doctrine of preemption. This doctrine prevents the application of state law on
the ground that federal law, either expressly or by implication, supersedes—or
preempts—it. For example, in the 2008 case of Rowe v. New Hampshire
Motor Transport Ass’n,16 the Court held, 5-4, that the federal Motor Carrier
Act of 198017 preempted a Maine statute regulating delivery of tobacco
products. But the preemption argument does not always prevail: in another
2008 cigarette case from Maine, also a 5-4 decision,18 the Court held that
federal cigarette labeling laws, which prohibited states from imposing health
warnings on cigarette packaging, did not preempt a state law concerned with
deceptive advertising. Also favoring the preemption doctrine, the Bush
Administration enacted approximately sixty regulations from 2006 to 2008
preempting state laws in a variety of areas.19
In all these developments, there are at least two common threads: Plaintiffs
are deprived of remedies when the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity,
or federal preemption doctrines apply, and defendants, whether the state or
corporations, benefit. Similar trends favoring defendants in securities cases
have been under way since 1995, both substantively and in terms of getting
those cases out of state court and into federal court. In the federal Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199520 (PSLRA), designed to prevent what

15. In Morrison, Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
non-economic criminal activity. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 618–19, 626–27
(2000).
16. 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 989, 995–96 (2008).
17. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
18. Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
19. Jess Bravin, Altria Case Deals Blow to Efforts Reining in Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Dec.
16, 2008, at A1. President Obama recently issued a memorandum reversing the Bush policy of
unchecked preemption via agency regulations. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama
to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption/.
The memorandum directs agencies to use preemption language in regulations “only when such
statements have a sufficient legal basis,” and it further instructs agencies to review regulations
promulgated in the past ten years to decide whether they meet this new standard. Id. The
Supreme Court heard argument in a recent preemption case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, on
April 28, 2009. Transcript of Oral Argument, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, No. 08-453 (U.S.
Apr. 28, 2009).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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Congress felt were abuses in litigation brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 and
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Congress made it more difficult
for cases to proceed without more specific proof the Act was violated. In the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199821 (SLUSA), Congress
preempted state law claims involving fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities. In a unanimous 2006 opinion, the Supreme Court extended the
reach of this law to include preemption of state law claims that the person was
induced to hold securities.22 And in the Class Action Fairness Act of 200523
(CAFA), Congress changed the previous law on the removability of class
action diversity cases to federal court, making it much easier for defendants to
get their cases into federal court and out of state courts they perceive as
plaintiff-friendly.
The pro-defendant tilt has not been limited to federal statutory
developments: As Justice Brennan noted in a 1977 law journal article, the
Supreme Court has for many years been cutting back on an expansive reading
of the constitutional protections concerning civil rights and liberties.24 This
trend prompted Brennan to encourage plaintiffs to seek redress under state
constitutional provisions rather than federal. A similar shift has occurred in the
area of federal habeas corpus. Federal courts, once willing to hear habeas
claims of state prisoners that their constitutional rights were violated in their
state trial under Fay v. Noia,25 have been unwilling to do so under Wainwright
v. Sykes.26 The majority and dissenting justices in Sykes engaged in heated
debates on the propriety of denying any remedy to state habeas petitioners
whose misfortune was to be represented by counsel whose mistakes prevented
any court, state or federal, from ever hearing the petitioners’ constitutional
defenses.27
Consistent with these federal statutory and constitutional developments,
the Court has largely abandoned the use of federal common law to imply
remedies from federal statutes28 and the Constitution.29 There has been one
21. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
22. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006).
23. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
24. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
25. 372 U.S. 391, 440–41 (1963).
26. 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
27. See id. at 113 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“Punishing a lawyer’s unintentional errors by
closing the federal courthouse door to his client is both a senseless and misdirected method of
deterring the slighting of state rules.”).
28. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433–35 (1964).
29. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (allowing recovery for damages upon proof of a violation of the Fourth Amendment),
with Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies
After Wilkie v. Robbins, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2006–2007, at 23 (Mark K. Moller
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exception. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,30 the Court was willing to
use federal common law to provide a defense to a state tort claim. That case
established for the first time the federal common law defense-contractor
defense. The dissenters accused the majority of favoring the interests of
corporations over those of the victims of corporate negligence.31 The Court
has demonstrated a recent unwillingness to read provisions of federal treaties
to protect individual rights in state criminal cases—that is, unless the treaty
itself explicitly states the provisions are to be self-executing. Otherwise, the
Court has said, Congress must pass legislation explicitly applying those
protections to trials in the U.S. courts.32
II. ONLY IN AMERICA: A DUAL SYSTEM OF TRIAL COURTS
From their previous law courses involving federal law, the students are
somewhat aware of the developments discussed above. They have not,
however, addressed systematically a question that is prompted by these
developments: what is the value of the United States having a dual system of
trial and intermediate appellate courts, one state and one federal, while other
countries have only one set of trial and appellate courts, with a constitutional
court—the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court—to resolve finally the
federal issues?33 From their first year Civil Procedure course, students are
familiar with the problems of forum-shopping in the context of diversity
jurisdiction in the years prior to Erie,34 when plaintiffs could game the system
by choosing whichever court, state or federal, would use the more favorable
law (state law or federal common law). Erie, of course, was aimed at stopping
this kind of forum-shopping by directing federal courts sitting in diversity to
follow state substantive law rather than federal common law. Much of the
discussion in connection with Erie revolves around this question: When is the
state law substantive, requiring the federal court to follow state law, and when
is it procedural, permitting the federal court to follow federal law?35

ed., 2007) (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to provide remedies for certain constitutional
wrongs).
30. 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988).
31. See id. at 530–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008).
33. Another country with parallel lower state and federal courts is Switzerland. See Fridolin
M.R. Walther, The Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, 29 INT’L J. LEGAL
INFO. 1, 5–6 (2001).
34. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938).
35. Compare Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (declaring that federal courts
should apply state statute of limitations under outcome-determinative test), with Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958) (noting that although the outcome
might have been different if the case were tried in state court, plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial
even though the judge would have been the fact-finder in state court). The Federal Rules of

GOLDMAN ARTICLE.DOC

2009]

WHY LAW STUDENTS SHOULD TAKE THE FEDERAL COURTS COURSE

751

The existence of two sets of trial and appellate courts to hear federal
questions presents similar problems: A state court may decide a federal
question one way; the federal court across the street may decide it the other;36
and until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict,37 there are two different
judicial interpretations of the meaning of federal law within a state.38 So, to
determine whether to apply state or federal procedure, should the outcomedeterminative test of Erie apply? In Felder v. Casey,39 the Court held that a
state’s notice-of-claim statute, which would have barred plaintiff’s § 1983
claim, was preempted by federal law, which had no such provision and would
thus have burdened federal rights.40 The Felder Court also referenced Erie,
and some scholars have argued that such cases are examples of “reverse
Erie.”41 Others, however, note the asymmetry of the two situations: State

Evidence, not state rules, would apply to the admissibility of expert testimony. See Brooks v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 999 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1993) (addressing the applicability of FED. R. EVID.
702–705). In contrast the state rules of evidence would apply, not the federal rules, where the
issues are presumptions, privileges, and competency of witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 302, 501,
601.
36. Compare Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding a ban on long
hair by the St. Charles County School District unconstitutional), with Kraus v. Bd. of Educ., 492
S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1973) (holding that a school board may constitutionally regulate hair
length). In the most recently completed term of the Supreme Court, October 2007 Term, the
Court issued opinions on the merits in sixty-seven cases, twelve of which came from the states.
The Supreme Court 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 525 (2008). This is the
lowest number of merits opinions since the October 1953 Term. That means that most decisions
by the lower courts, either state or federal, will not be reviewed, and thus most conflicting
decisions on matters of federal law are left standing.
37. One of the three reasons set forth for granting certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court is a
conflict on an important federal question between a state court of last resort and a decision of a
U.S. Court of Appeals or another state court of last resort. SUP. CT. R. 10(b).
38. A federal habeas court may, in effect, reverse the decision of a state criminal court on
matters of constitutional law, but the scope of federal habeas has narrowed in recent years. See
supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
39. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
40. Id. at 141. Two areas where state courts and federal courts may reach different results in
federal question cases involve summary judgments and qualification of experts. See supra note
35. Must state courts follow federal law in this area on the grounds that federal rights would
thereby be burdened if the state law were followed? The Supreme Court rejected that argument
in Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) and permitted the state court in a § 1983 case to apply
its rule denying an interlocutory appeal by a state official from the denial of qualified immunity
by the trial judge, id. at 922–23, despite the contrary rule that would apply were the case to have
been heard in a federal court under Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308–09 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Reverse-Erie, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
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courts must, under the Supremacy Clause, follow federal policy, whereas
federal courts are under no such obligation to follow state law.42
From their first-year Civil Procedure course, students will recall that
federal courts have jurisdiction in diversity and federal question cases. The
students are surprised, however, to learn that although diversity jurisdiction
existed from the very first Judiciary Act in 1789, there was no general federal
question jurisdiction until after the Civil War. Thus, during most of the first
100 years of the existence of lower federal courts, there were only two ways
federal questions could be heard in federal court—first, if there was a specific
federal statute granting jurisdiction or second, if the federal claim arose in the
context of a diversity case.
Many students believe that cases involving federal statutes, such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may be heard only
in federal court, not in state court. To the contrary, the presumption is that
federal questions will be heard by state courts. Only if Congress explicitly
denies jurisdiction to state courts are they disabled from hearing such cases.43
Students are also often surprised to learn that Article III does not require
Congress to create the lower federal courts44—that the United States could
have followed the practice of other countries of leaving the trial and initial
appeal of federal questions, constitutional and statutory, to the equivalent of
state courts. After all, state officers take an oath to support the U.S.
Constitution, and there is a separate obligation on state judges to follow federal

42. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 414–15
(6th ed. 2009). In Haywood v. Drown, the Court considered “[w]hether a state’s withdrawal of
jurisdiction over certain . . . claims against state corrections employees—from state courts of
general jurisdiction—may be constitutionally applied to exclude federal claims under Section
1983 . . . when . . . the state legislature withdrew jurisdiction because it concluded that permitting
such lawsuits is bad policy.” See Brief for Respondents at i, Haywood v. Drown, No. 07-10374
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2008). The Court held that despite the State’s equal treatment of state and federal
claims under the procedural rule at issue, the provision violated the Supremacy Clause because it
was “contrary to Congress’ judgment that all persons who violate federal rights while acting
under color of state law shall be held liable for damages.” Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___,
No. 07-10374, 2009 WL 1443136, at *1 (May 26, 2009).
43. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (“This deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of course, rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts
the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.”). Even if state courts do not want
to hear federal claims, they must do so, unless they have a valid excuse not to hear them. See
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
44. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001) (“Article III . . . leaves to Congress the
decision whether to create lower federal courts at all.”). Students are equally surprised to learn
that state criminal prosecutions may take place in federal district court. See, e.g., Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 259, 271 (1879) (criminal prosecution of officer’s enforcing federal revenue
law in state court removable to federal court). The general removal statute now covers any
federal officer raising a federal defense. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006).
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law, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”45
I return to the question of why the United States has federal trial courts at
the end of the course when we discuss federal question jurisdiction. The
specific question we consider then is whether there is such a doctrine as
protective jurisdiction, by which federal courts are able to hear a case because
it involves an entity, like the U.S. Bank,46 or a topic, like labor-management
contracts,47 even though the substantive law to be applied is state law. The
students quickly see the need for federal jurisdiction. They understand that
state courts might be biased against a party (the U.S. Bank) or the subject
matter (labor-management contracts), just as they might be biased against a
party from another state, with this difference—diversity jurisdiction is
explicitly mentioned in Article III as a basis for jurisdiction, but not so
“protective jurisdiction.” That leads to a discussion of whether Article III’s
grant of jurisdiction for cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties” is broad enough to encompass protective
jurisdiction.
Students who are asked why there should be lower federal courts typically
respond by saying federal judges are less political than state judges and
therefore can better render decisions based on the law rather than personal
preferences. Compared to state judges, who might be unwilling to rule against
state political figures involved in future judicial re-election campaigns, federal
judges, with life tenure and salary protection, are more likely to be willing to
rule against state political figures.48 That leads to a discussion of how federal
judges are appointed compared to state judges and an examination of the
backgrounds of members of the state and federal judiciaries.49 Students are
usually aware of the federal appointments process and may have heard about
elections of state judges,50 but they are usually unaware of the non-partisan
45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
46. See Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
47. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
48. It is very unlikely state courts would get the opportunity to rule against federal officials
because of the ability of the federal official to remove the case to federal court. See supra note 44
and accompanying text. Even in the absence of a removal statute, the Supreme Court has
prohibited state courts from taking jurisdiction against federal officials, at least in the context of a
habeas corpus action where federal courts did have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1871) (“If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned it is for the courts or
judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone, to grant him release.”).
49. To introduce students to this topic, I often invite federal judges to speak to my classes.
In the Fall of 2008–2009 semester, Judge Duane Benton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit spoke to my Constitutional Law II class. He had a unique perspective, having
served for many years on the Supreme Court of Missouri prior to joining the Eighth Circuit.
50. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 526 U.S. 765 (2002), the Supreme Court
held the First Amendment was violated by a state supreme court canon of judicial ethics that
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court plans that limit the governor’s influence on the selection of judges.51
Students are often surprised to learn that many federal judges have had
significant political experience prior to joining the bench52—and that this is not
necessarily a negative in terms of being a good judge. Students are interested
in lawyers’ preferences on the method of judicial selection: To the extent nonpartisan selection plans or electoral contests result in selection of judges
favorable—or at least not unfavorable—to plaintiffs, those systems will be
preferred by plaintiffs’ lawyers. Defense lawyers, however, tend to prefer the
federal appointments process, especially given the recent conservative
appointees to the federal bench. Some conservative lawyers are supportive of

prohibited a judicial candidate running for office from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.” In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., argued March 3, 2009, the Court
faces the problem of financial contributions to a judge’s campaign and how that might influence a
decision by the judge in a case coming before him. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No.
33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (Nov. 14, 2008).
The question presented is “[w]hether a judge’s failure to recuse himself from a case in which he
received substantial campaign donations from one of the parties violates the Due Process rights of
the other party.” Court to Rule on When Judges Must Recuse Themselves (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://otd.oyez.org/articles/2008/11/18/court-rule-when-judges-must-recuse-themselves-nov-142008; see Brief for Petitioners at I, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29,
2008).
51. Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, the Governor appoints three members of the
seven-person Appellate Judicial Commission, lawyers who are members of the Missouri Bar
select three lawyers to the Commission, and the chair is the Chief Justice of the Missouri
Supreme Court. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a)–(g). The Commission sends three names to the
Governor, who must select from the slate presented to him. Id. After serving for at least a year,
the judge stands for retention at a non-contested election and must receive approval from a
majority of the voters; thereafter, there is another retention vote after each term of office. See id.
Supreme Court and appellate judges are appointed under the Missouri Plan, whereas most trial
judges run for election in these states, except in major metropolitan areas. See id.
52. Until the 1980s, they had often worked in some capacity for one of the U.S. senators in
the state—on the senator’s staff or a fundraiser for senatorial campaigns—and senators played a
major role in sending names of potential district court nominees to the President, especially when
the President and the senator were from the same political party. See NANCY SCHERER, SCORING
POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS
192–93 (2005). However, beginning in the Reagan presidency, the judicial philosophy of the
appointee has become the most important factor in nominating district court and court of appeals
judges. See id. at 160, 193–94. Since the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1987, judicial philosophy has come to be the predominant factor in nominating
Supreme Court Justices. See id. at 115.
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efforts to elect judges.53 Other conservative groups have concluded the
Missouri Plan is better for business than judicial elections.54
Another justification for having the lower federal courts often given by
students is that federal judges historically have been more sympathetic to
claims of federal plaintiffs—particularly in cases involving civil rights and
civil liberties—both in terms of finding of facts and interpreting federal law.
Historically, the context for Congress’s giving federal courts general federal
question jurisdiction was the Reconstruction era, when it was assumed state
courts would not give a sympathetic hearing to claims brought by beneficiaries
of the newly enacted civil rights laws. Similar concerns prompted Congress to
enact civil rights removal statutes55 as well as statutes permitting federal
officials who are enforcing federal law to remove suits against them in state
courts, both civil and criminal.56
The issue of the federal judiciary’s sympathy to plaintiffs resurfaces when
we discuss the constitutionality of federal legislation stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction over certain substantive areas of law. In arguing that such laws are
unconstitutional, some scholars maintain that federal courts, because of their
insulation from political control through the provisions of Article III, have a
special role in constitutional interpretation that cannot be played by state
courts.57 Assuming that was the case in Warren Court era of the 1960s, is it
still true today?
III. FORUM SHOPPING: STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURT
It is at this point that the world of theory meets the world of practice. And
it is another reason why students find the course so interesting: Depending on
the demographics of a particular community, plaintiffs’ lawyers may or may
not prefer federal courts to state courts. Among the myriad factors the
plaintiff’s lawyer must weigh are: whether there is a right to a jury;58 the

53. See Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, The Federalist
Society (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/PubID.90/pub_detail.asp (“[D]efense
lawyers should not be automatically seen as faithful protectors of the interests of businesses and
consumers on the nominating commissions of Missouri Plan states.”).
54. See Joshua C. Hall & Russell S. Sobel, Is the “Missouri Plan” Good for Missouri? The
Economics of Judicial Selection, Show-Me Institute Policy Study Number 15, at 1 (May 21,
2008), available at http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_15.pdf (“Based on
our analysis, Missouri’s current system is far superior to several of the alternatives.”).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
58. In federal court, the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to a
jury trial if the matter would have been tried to a jury at common law, but that amendment has not
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demographics of the jury pool, including race59 and gender;60 the extent of voir
dire;61 the ability of the plaintiff to get to the jury rather than having the case
dismissed on summary judgment;62 the need for unanimity in getting a

yet been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus a state is not required to provide
a civil jury as a matter of federal constitutional law. And it is not the case that plaintiffs always
prefer a jury trial. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 (1974). In Curtis, the black plaintiff
sued the white defendant for housing discrimination under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 (Fair Housing Act). 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). The defendant sought a jury trial, but the
plaintiff argued the case should be tried to the judge. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, held the defendant was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
59. According to the 2000 census, the racial composition of St. Louis City residents 21 and
over was 49% white, 45% black, and 6% Hispanic, Asian, Indian, or “Other.” The Annual Jury
Management Report indicated that for the 2007–2008 time period, the percentage of prospective
jurors “summoned, qualified and available for impanelment” was 57% white, 41% black and 2%
Hispanic, Asian, Indian or “Other.” Annual Jury Management Report, Office of the Jury
Supervisor, July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008, at p. 4. Statistics are not kept on the racial composition
of a typical panel, but anecdotal evidence suggests that blacks are disproportionately struck—in
criminal cases by the prosecutor who believes they cannot give a fair hearing to the state because
of their distrust of police officers and in civil cases by defendants who believe blacks are proplaintiff. The percentage of blacks qualified as jurors on August 22, 2005 in the three divisions
making up the Eastern District of Missouri compared to their percentage of the population in the
divisions is as follows: Eastern Division—10.33%/16.00%; Northern Division—1.33%/3.60%;
Southeastern Division—1.00%/5.60%. Report on Operation of the Jury Selection Plan, August
22, 2005 (on file with publication). As in the state system, there are no statistics kept by the court
on the percentages of blacks on petit juries. Race-based peremptory challenges of jurors have
been held to be unconstitutional in the following situations: by prosecutors in criminal cases,
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); by a defendant in a criminal case, Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); and by litigants in civil cases, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). In People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), a California appellate court held that Batson applies to a motion to disqualify a judge
based on his race.
60. Concurring in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., a case in which the state used most of its
peremptory challenges to strike males in the context of a paternity and child support case and
which the Court disapproved, Justice O’Connor wrote:
We know that, like race, gender matters. A plethora of studies make clear that in rape
cases, for example, female jurors are somewhat more likely to vote to convict than male
jurors. Moreover, though there have been no similarly definitive studies regarding, for
example, sexual harassment, child custody, or spousal or child abuse, one need not be a
sexist to share the intuition that, in certain cases, a person’s gender and resulting life
experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case.
511 U.S. 127, 148–49 (O’Connor concurring) (citation omitted) (citing REID HASTIE, ET. AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY 140–41 (1983) (collecting and summarizing empirical studies)).
61. Lawyers typically have more involvement in voir dire in state courts than in federal
courts, jury pools are usually larger than in federal courts and state judges are usually more
willing to permit strikes of jurors for cause than are federal judges.
62. Compare the frequency of summary judgment in federal employment discrimination
cases with the ease of getting to the jury in FELA cases under federal law. Dice v. Akron Canton
& Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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verdict;63 and the perceived sympathy or lack thereof of the trial and appellate
courts in the two systems.64 In some geographical areas, plaintiffs’ lawyers
will avoid state courts, particularly where the community is hostile to the
federal claims and judges are elected by an unsympathetic citizenry, or where
the judges are unfamiliar with the subject matter of the case. Similarly,
defense counsel may seek out state courts, particularly specialized courts, such
as Delaware’s Chancery Court that has developed an expertise in corporate law
or Miami-Dade’s Business Division.65
Federal employment discrimination cases have been analyzed in recent
years, based on data from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. A 2004 study indicated that such cases were the largest component of
federal civil cases, 10% of the civil docket. At all stages—pre-trial, trial, and
appeal—plaintiffs in employment cases fared badly.66 A 2008 study indicates
that these cases now make up just 6% of the district courts’ civil docket.
Although in civil cases as a whole the affirmance rate by the U.S. courts of
appeals is 80%, defendants in employment discrimination cases have a 41%
chance of reversal and plaintiffs just a 9% chance of reversal. That “might
help to explain the last seven years’ drop of over 20% in plaintiffs’ bringing
cases in the federal district courts.”67
Given the reasons discussed above, it is not surprising that defendants
generally want to remove their cases to federal court. Under the general
removal statute, defendants may remove to federal court “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have

63. In the federal system, unanimity is required, in both civil and criminal cases; in many
state civil trials, only a three-fourths verdict is required, and in some states, criminal cases may
also be decided by non-unanimous votes. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Capital
cases may require unanimity. See Robbie Brown, In Georgia, Push to End Unanimity for
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at A14.
64. Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, at A1 (“Republican-appointed judges, most of them conservatives, are projected to make
up about 62 percent of the bench next Inauguration Day, up from 50 percent when Mr. Bush took
office. They control 10 of the 13 circuits, while judges appointed by Democrats have a dwindling
majority on just one circuit.”). The article notes that many of the judges appointed by President
George W. Bush are young, hence they are likely to be on the bench for many years. Id. At the
time President Obama took office, there were 13 vacancies on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (7.3%)
and 42 vacancies on the U.S. District Courts (6.2%). Vacancy Summary—110th Congress,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cfapps/webnova/CF_FB_301/archived/summary01_01_09.html.
65. There are also specialized federal courts, for example, the Federal Circuit for patent
appeals.
66. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Cases Fare
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004)
67. Stewart J. Schwab & Kevin M. Clermont, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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original jurisdiction.”68 Diversity cases may be removed only if none of the
defendants are residents of the state in which the action is brought.69 As a
result, plaintiffs’ lawyers in some federal districts will file employment
discrimination cases under state law against the out-of-state company instead
of seeking to bring their cases to federal courts. They will attempt to defeat
removal by adding a non-diverse party, such as the supervisor, who may be
sued as a party under state employment discrimination laws. In the general
removal statute, Congress has prohibited the removal of cases from state to
federal court in the following instances: Federal Employment Liability Act
cases brought against a railroad ,70 state workers’ compensation cases,71 and
civil cases brought under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.72 In
addition to the general removal statute, Congress has prohibited removal in
statutes governing specific areas of federal law.73 Clearly, if Congress were to
determine that plaintiffs ought to have the final choice on where to file suits in
other substantive areas, such as Title VII, it could make similar exceptions and
prohibit removal.
Typically, state courts will not have the support of law clerks to conduct
legal research, whereas federal judges may rely on clerks to do extensive
research. This disparity may influence the decision on where to file (or
whether to remove), especially in cases where legal issues are important.
Litigating cases in federal court presents challenges not experienced in state
court. Federal judges are not, as a general rule, as accessible as in state court.
Most motions are submitted in writing and not argued. Hearings on qualifying
experts to testify can take many days.74 The effort required for preparation of

68. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
69. Id. § 1441(b). In CAFA, supra note 23, Congress permitted removal where there is
minimal diversity, that is, where one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states, thus
making removal much easier in class actions covered under that statute.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2006). Suits for less than $10,000 brought against common
carriers are not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b). Most FELA cases filed by injured railroad
workers around the country are filed in state court. Interview with Jerome Schlichter, President,
Academy of Rail Labor Attorneys in St. Louis, Mo. (Dec. 14, 2008).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (2006).
72. Id. § 1445(d).
73. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000) (dealing with cases under the Jones Act where a
seaman or railworker is injured in the course of employment); Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182
F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1999); Alajoki v. Inland Steel Co., 635 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); but see 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (providing an exception for certain
class actions that may be removed under SLUSA).
74. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Court held that
the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for admissibility of
testimony by an expert had been rejected by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court limited the role of courts of appeals in reviewing
the district courts’ decisions on whether or not to admit the testimony to an abuse of discretion
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the pretrial order is extensive. ADR, authorized by the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990,75 adds costs to the parties, who must pay their own counsel as
well as those of the mediator.76 These pretrial requirements encourage
settlements—whether because they focus the parties on the strengths and
weaknesses of their positions before trial or because they wear out one side or
the other—and in the long run, may lower costs to the parties.77 But faced with
these costs, a sole practitioner, especially when representing a client on a
contingent fee, may avoid federal court altogether,78 inconsistent with

standard. And in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court held the
Daubert standard applied to non-scientific expert testimony. Although the Court in Daubert
intended expert testimony to be more liberally admitted than it was under Frye, in fact, it has
resulted in more limited use of expert testimony compared to state courts, typically to the
disadvantage of the plaintiff. Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho have now been codified in Federal
Rules of Evidence 701, 702, and 703. If the testimony of plaintiff’s expert is excluded on
Daubert grounds, the consequence is likely to be the granting of defendant’s summary judgment
motion, because that often means the plaintiff is unable to prove causation without an expert’s
testimony. In State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146
(Mo. banc 2003), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected both the Frye and Daubert standards in
favor of the Missouri statute on expert testimony in civil cases, section 490.065 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, which incorporates some of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert
testimony but rejects other parts. Whether it will turn out to be more or less restrictive than
Daubert is yet to be determined.
Another evidentiary area where different rules can influence a choice of forum is the
admissibility of evidence on subsequent remedial measures in product liability cases, where states
often do not follow the exclusionary rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 407.
75. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. This Act required each district court to implement
a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, to include referring “appropriate cases to
alternative dispute resolution programs . . . including mediation.” 28 U.S.C. § 473 (2006). In its
findings, Congress was concerned about the “cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on
access to the courts.” Id. § 102. In some districts, mediation is voluntary; in others, it may be
imposed by the judge on the parties without consent.
76. In some districts, mediators serve pro bono.
77. Since 2003, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has surveyed both
parties and attorneys involved in mediation. Most mediations in this district are voluntary. Of
the 612 attorney responses received as of January, 2009, 91% (540) indicated the benefits
outweighed the costs. Of the parties who responded, 86% (190) indicated the benefits
outweighed the costs. In terms of costs to the parties—out of pocket and attorneys fees (during
this time period, the mediators in this district served pro bono)—59% of the attorneys estimated
that the cost to their client was $2,500 or less, 21% estimated the costs were between $2500 and
$5,000, 9% estimated costs were between $5,000 and $10,000, and 4% estimated the costs were
over $10,000. (Survey on file with author). Of course, in a district where mediation is not
voluntary, and where mediators’ fees must be paid by the parties, the surveys are likely to have
different outcomes.
78. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that due process required
a waiver of the filing and service of process fees in the context of divorce. However, the Court
upheld filing fees for bankruptcy in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). In M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), the Court held that due process required the state to provide a record
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Congress’s intent to control costs and increase access to the federal courts.
These reasons may explain, in part, why the percentage of federal cases
nationwide resolved by trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.79
CONCLUSION
Federal Courts is a course that is both highly theoretical and quite practical
for students. Having taught it for over twenty years, I find it the most
challenging course I teach—and the most rewarding. Over the years, many
returning graduates have told me that, to their surprise, the course proved quite
helpful for many of the subject-matter areas covered on their bar examinations.
And many former students have told me that it proved to be invaluable for
their work in the federal courts—as law clerks, judges, or practitioners. The
question of why we have lower federal courts is worth raising anew, and the
answers are likely to differ for each generation of law students.

from the trial that resulted in termination of parental rights to enable her to appeal. Since a
plaintiff has the option of filing the federal claim in state court, it is unlikely there would be a due
process problem, but if defendant removes, the cost issues discussed in text resurface.
79. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 (2004).

